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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the desireability and feasibility in the context
of the u.S. financial system of purchasing<power annuities (PPA), i.e.,
retirement annuities offering some kind of consumer price level indexation.
After investigating the inadequacies of conventional and equity-based
variable annuities in an inflationary environment, the paper assesses the
suitability of money market instruments hedged with commodity futures
contracts as the asset base for PPA's and eonsiders the possib1ity of having
life insurance companies and private pension plans offer them to the public.
The empirical evidence of the past 26 years indicates that the real (inflation-
adjusted) earnings rate which these financial institutions should use in
pricing PPA's is at most zero.
Zvi Bodie




On page 21, line 15, "of T-Bills . . " should read "of corrnnodity futures . . "'_ Noyember, 1979
Purchasing - Power Annuities: Financial
Innovation for Stable Real Retirement Income in an
Inflationary Environment
Zvi Bodie
Boston univers~ty Scho~~of Management and
National Bureau o~ Econqmic Research
I., Introduction
In no area of financial planning is the problem created by
inflation more acute than in providing for retirement income. The.)
essence of the problem is that a household's needs are defined in terms
of real goods and services while conventional private pension plans and
contractual savings schemes offer a money fixed stream of benefits.
In the U.S. the problem is mitigated somewhat by the fact that Social
Security currently does provide a cost-of-living adjustment to its
retirement benefits. But for most households, Social Security benefits
provide only a "floor" which must be supplemented at least in part with
income from other retirement plans. It is no wonder, therefore, that
labor unions have started to include a demand for cost-of-living escalators
in pension benefits in their recent contract negotiations.
In an inflationary environment, conventional money-fixed
pensions and contractual savings plans are risky both as a vehicle
for accumulating savings and as a source of retirement benefits.
This was one of the considerations which led to the
development of equity-based variable annuities (VA's) in the
1950's. At that time it was believed that common stocks could
provide a hedge against inflation, in the sense that stock prices
would on average increase at the same rate as the prices of consump-
tion g>ods. By investing a portion of its retirement funds in an-2-
equity based VA, it was thought the household could thus protect itself
. fl . 1 I against J.n atJ.on.
The experience with VA's has been disappointing but not really that
surprising. After all, even:i.f it were true, as many hypothesized,
that the inflation-adjusted or real rate of return on common stocks
is tmaffected by the rate of inflation, this would not imply that they
are a riskless investment. By switching ftmds out of money-fixed
securities and into stocks, an investor would at best be eliminating
his exposure to inflation risk but only at the cost of exposing himself
to substantial business and financial risk.2
What is needed is a different kind of annuity, which is
defined in purchasing-power terms. It is the purpose of this
paper to present a proposal for such a financial instrument,
which we shall call a purchasing power annuity (PPA)', and to
explore its feasibiiity in the context of the U.S. financial
system. It would seem that the only asset which could provide
a base for such an annuity Would be default-free bonds linked to
some index of the cost of living.3 Although proposals for the U.S.
government or some other institution to issue such price-indexed
bonds have abounded, there is no indication that anyone with the
power and authority to implement any of these proposals is inclined
to do so.4-3-
Given the apparent reluctance, if not outright opposition,
on the part of the government and private corporations to the
issuance of price-indexed bonds the relevant question is
whether there is any other asset, or combination of assets,
currently existing in the U.S. financial system which could
fulfill the same function. The empirical evidence suggests that the
most promising asset base for PPA's is short-term bonds hedged against
unanticipated inflation with a small position in a well-diversified
portfolio of commodity futures contracts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
part we explore the inadequacies of conventional and equity-based
variable annuities in an inflationary environment by contrast-
ting them with a hypothetical PPA. We then try to assess the
suitability of money market instruments hedged with commodity futures as the
asset base for PPA's, and consider the possibility of having life insurance
companies and private pension plans offer them to the public.
Finally, we conclude with a brief summary' and discussion of the proposal.-4-
II. The Nature of the Problem and the Demand for PPA's
The problems created by conventional annuities in a period
of rapid and unpredictable inflation are best considered by
dividing a household's lifetime into a pre-retirement (or accumu-
lation) period and a retirement period. We will first focus on
the accumulation phase by assuming that the household has decided
that it will need a fund of $100,000 in terms of today's
purchasing power in order to finance its consumption flow during
retirement and that it has 30 years left before then. At
an 8% per year rate of inflation the fund would have to have a
nominal value of $1,006,266 in it 30 years from now in order for
its real value in terms of today's purchasing power to be $100,000;
a ratio of roughly 10 to 1.
There are two major problems associated with trying to meet
this savings goal with a conventional retirement savings plan,
which calls for equal periodic dollar contributions over the
working years. The first problem is that the time pattern of
contributions in real terms will not in general match the time
pattern of the household's real labor income, and the second is
that there will be considerable uncertainty about the eventual
purchasing power of the dollar amount accumulated in the fund.
Both of these problems can be clarified with an example.
Suppose the household is considering investing in a con-
ventional retirement savings plan offering a nominal interest
rate of 8% per year and consisting of 30 equal annual contribu-
tions. In order to accumulate $1,006,266 by the end of the
30 year period, the annual premium would have to be $8883.-5-
For most households this would represent an unrealistically high
proportion of its current labor income. On the other hand, if
the household's nominal labor income keeps pace with inflation
during the working years, even with no real income growth, by
the end of the period the ratio of premium to income will
have shrunk to one-tenth its initial value. Furthermore with
the conventional plan the household has no assurance that its
savings goal will be met in real terms. Since the rate of
inflation is not known with certainty, the real value of the
fund at retirement may turn out to be far from 100,000 constant
dollars (c$lOO,OOO).For example, if the rate of inflation averages
10% per year the real value of the fund will be only
c$57,668, while at 6% per year inflation its real value will
be c$175,201.
Now let us contrast this conventional money-fixed savings
plan with a hypothetical PPA, which calls for a level flow of
annual contributions in terms of constant dollars. Since the
expected real rate of interest S$sumed on the conventional plan was
zero, let us use that same real rate for the PPA. In order
to accumulate c$lOO,OOO at the end of 30 years, the annual
premiUJ!} would have to be c$3333 l/3~ "A't 8% l?el;" yea;r
inflation the current dollar amount of the premiUJ!} would
start at $3,600 at the end of the first year and climb to
$33,542 by the last payment. Assuming the household's labor income
remains constant in real terms, the ratio of premium to income
remains constant.-6- -
Many insurance companies have in recent years taken steps
to move partially in the direction of this PPA accumulation idea
by including a cost-of-living clause in their insured savings
plans, which allows policyholders to increase coverage in accor-
dance with the annual rise in the price level. But typically
the interest rate earned under these plans remains fixed in
nominal terms, so that although the saver can achieve a better
time profile of contributions, he still faces considerable risk
of not achieving his ultimate savings goal in real terms.
To deal with this latter problem of a fixed nominal
earnings rate insurance companies started offering equity-based
variable annuities (VA's) in the 1950's. The impetus for creating
these savings plans came from the idea that common stocks are a
long-run hedge against inflation, in the sense that over a long
holding-period one could count on earning a positive real rate
of return, i.e., a nominal rate of at least whatever the rate of
inflation turned out to be.
Unfortunately, this idea has only limited merit. Even if
it were true that the mean real rate of return on equity was
positive regardless of the rate of inflation, if the annual
fluctuations around that mean are independently distributed and
fairly large, then even with an investment horizon which is
far in the future, one can miss 9ne's savings target by quite a bit~ for
example, suppose we wanted to invest a sum now which would provide
us with c$lOO,OOO for retirement 30 years from now. If we could-7-
countona4% per year real rate of return then we would have to
invest $30,832. But if the average compound real rate of return
turned out to be off by only 1%, so .that we wound up ~arning
only 3 ratherthan4% per year, we would have only c$74,837 at
the end of the 30 year period.
Of course, an equity~based VA offering a mean real rate of
return of 4% per year may be an attractive alternative to a con~
ventional annuity offering an expected real rate of return of
zero. Furthermore, by dividing its retirement savings between
a conventional money-fixed plan and a VA, the household can achieve
a better risk-return combination than by investing all of its funds
in either one alone. However, no mixture of these two types of
savings plans can prOVide the household with a truly low risk option
in real terms.
ine ~ccd f.or a PPA alternative to conventional money-fixed
annuities and equity-based VA's is even greater in the retirement
phase of the household's lifetime. Let us first consider the
conventional money-fixed annuity. Even with a deterministic rate
of inflation, equal periodic dollar amounts imply a negative "tilt"
to the stream of real retirement income, which many households
might not want. Moreover, in an environment with an uncertain
rate of inflation, both the level and the slope of the real stream
of benefits are unpredictable and out of the beneficiary's control.-8-
To illustrate this point let us consider a conventional retirement
annuity which is assumed to last 15 years (from retirement until death)
at a nominal interest rate of 8% per year and compare it to a hypothetical
purchasing-power annuity (PPA) which earns a real interest rate of zero.
It is important to stress that in comparing conventional annuities to PPA's,
the relevant comparison is not between a conventional money-fixed annuity
and the~ annuity with an escalator clause. In pension planning as in
all other areas of personal finance, there is no free lunch! Assuming
that the beneficiary has accumulated $100,00 for retirement, the PPA
would pay the annuitant c$6,667 per year, while the conventional annuity
would pay $11,683 per year.
Table land Figure 1 show the pattern of real income flows associa-
ted with the conventional annuity for various rates of inflation·.
If as anticipated tQe actual rate o~ ~nflation over tQe life of the
annuity turns out to be 8% per year th.en th.e real value of the
conventional annuity :elow will start at c$lO,8l8 in the fj,rst year and fall
to c$3683 in th.e 15th.. Whi.le some reti.rees might view this pattern as
preferable to a constant real flow of c$6667 per year, the conventional
annuity offers no guarantee that it will be realized. Should the rate
of inflation turn out to be 12% per year, the stream of real payments
will be both lower and more steeply tilted than anticipated, starting
at c$lO,43l in year 1 and fall!ng to c$2l34 by year 15. 0:f course, if the
retiree is lucky, the rate of inflation might turn out to be less th~,
8% per year, but most people would prefer not to speculate with their
retirement income.-9-
Table 1: Real Value of Cash Flow of $11,683 per year from
a Conventional Annuity at Selected Rates of Inflation.
Rate of Inflation
Year 4% 6% 8% 10% 12%
1 c$11,234 c$11,022 c$10,8l8 c$10,62l c$10,43l
3 10,386 9,809 9,274 8,778 8,316
5 9,603 8,730 1,951 7,254 6,629
7 8,878 7,770 6,817 5,995 5,285
10 7,893 6,524 5,411 4,504 3,762
12 7,297 5,806 4,639 3,723 2,999
15 6,487 4,875 3,683 2,797 2,134











For retirees who like the idea of a real stream of retirement
benefits which has a downward tilt, it would be relatively simple to
design a PPA with this property. The essential distinguishing feature of
the PPA, however, would remain the same: the slope and level of the
benefit stream should be fixed in real terms and unaffected by the actual
rate of inflation.
Which brings us again to< acons:Lderation of equity-based variable annui-
ties. Under a VA the annuitant's retirement fund is invested in a diversified
.-..,.
portfolio of common stocks which is managed by the institution offering
the annuity. Most of the risk associated with the value of this portfolio
and the rate of return on it are passed through to the annuitant. This
is accomplished by defining the periodic ~efitin teriilsof a fixed
number of annuity units, which are essentially shares of the underlying
stock portfolio. The dollar amount of the benefit is then just
the fixed number of annuity units times the current market value of a
unit.
Let us illustrate the VA and its drawbacks with a concrete example.
Since there are some differences in the kinds of VA's offered, we wi~l'
focus on a hypothetical one, which typifies the species. As in the case
of the conventional, money-fixed annuity, let us assume that our household
has accumulated $100,000 in its retirement fund and is purchasing a
..
15 year annuity. The insurance company uses this money to buy a portfolio
of stocks and sets the initial number of annuity units or "shares" at 10,000,
each thus having an initial value of, $10. It then determines an
assumed earnings rate in order to compute the amount of the periodic
payment in terms of annuity units. Let us assume a 4% pe_r_ year rate,
which represents a "conservative" judgement on the part of the company as
to th~.ayerage··i:eal rate of return ~~~ich··win De earned on the stock
portfolio. The annuity benefit will then be 899.4,annuity units per year.-11-
The actual experience with VA~s~ however~ has been disappointing.
Figure 2 and Table 2 present the experience of the College Retirement
Equities Fund (~REF), which pioneered the VA. The value of an annuity
unit at CREF's inception on July 1, 1952 was set at $10, which in tenus
of 1967 purchasing power was worth c$12.52. Since that time its real
value has fluctuated considerably in value from year to year, trending
its way to a peak of c$31.92 in 1967 and then falling back to .c$11.86
by 1978. It is ironic and expecially disappointing that it has done
particularly poorly in the last ten years, the period of the most
rapid inflation.
Imagine the plight of a CREF beneficiary who started receiving
his benefits in 1967, when the current dollar value of an annuity
unit was $31.92. Assuming he had accumulated $100,000 in his
fund prior to retirement, he would have been entitled to a monthly
benefit of 19.103 annuity units, with a current dollar value of
6 $609.76 per month. In 1978 his monthly benefit would have been
$444.72 in current dollars and only c$226.56 in tenus of 1967 purchasing
vower.-12-
"
Figure 2 Changes In TIAA and CREF Income Amounts and the Consumer Price Index
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Tab1"e 2 CREF ANNUITY UNIT VALUES SINCE 1952
(Annuity Year: May through April)
Constant
dollars Constant Constant
Current (base year: Current dollars Current dollars
dollars 1967) dollars (1967) dollars (1967)
1952 $10.00 c$12.52 1961 $26.25 c$29.29 1970 $28.91 c$24.82
1953 9.46 11.78 1962 26.13 28.86 1971 30.64 25.20
1954 10.74 13.34 1963 22.68 24.67 1972 35.74 28.53
1955 14.11 17.58 1964 26.48 28.49 1973 31.58 23.84
1956 18.51 22.62 1965 28.21 29.82 1974 26.21 17.74
1957 16.88 19.96 1966 30.43 31.29 1975 21.84 13.49
1958 16.71 19.28 1967 31. 92 31.92 1976 26.24 15.37
1959 22.03 25.22 1968 29.90 28.66 1977 24.80 13.61
1960 22.18 25.05 1969 32.50 29.54 1978 23.28 11.86
o'
Source: Figure 2 is taken from TIAA-CREF ·(13). p.9 and Table 2 is based on
TIAA-CREF (141. p. 19.-13-
Although equity-based VA's have failed to provide a source of
stable real retirement income, the basic principle behind them could
be applied in creating an annuity with characteristics similar to the
hypothetical PPA described before. All that is needed is an asset offering
a more stable real rate of return than common stocks.- 14 -
III. Money Market Instruments as an Asset Base for PPA's
The only assets which could offer a completely satisfactory
investment base for PPA's would be securities explicitly linked
to the consumer price level, such as index bonds or price-level-
adjusted mortgages. In lieu of such index-linked securities, recent
historical evidence suggests that the most promising asset base for
PPA's in the u.s. is short-term bonds hedged against unanticipated
inflation with a small position in a well-diversified portfolio of
commodity futures contracts. Umlike index bonds, these securities
cannot provide a completely risk-free real rate of return. They
can, however, be used t~ produce a much more stable real rate of
return than can be earned on the traditional pension fund assets:
long-term bonds and common stocks; and unlike index bonds they do
already exist.
Table 3 presents the year-by-year real rates of return one would
have earned on various categories of investments during the 26-year
period from January 1953 through December 1978. The first column is the
real rate of return on a policy of "rolling-over" 30-day Treasury Bills.
Fama(6] maintains that the nominal rate of return on 30-day T-Bills'is
determined as the sum of a time-invariant real rate plus the market's
expectation of the rate of inflation over the coming month. If the
market's short-run inflation expectations are fairly accurate then the
annual real rate of return reported in column 1 should not vary much
over time. Indeed, over the period investigated by Fama, 1953 to 1972,
the real rate on 30-day Bills averaged 1% per year and had a standard
deviation of orily 0.69%. But as the last column in Table 3 shows, a
serious escalation in the rate of inflation occurred in 1973 and 1974,
and the real rate of return on Bills has not been able to recover since
then. The mean real rate of return during the 1973-1978 period was -1.62%
with a standard deviation of 1.29%.- 15 -






















































































































































































































































Sources; The data on 1.month bills, 20 year bonds, and stocks are from
Ibbotson and Sinquefield, Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation,
Financial Analysts Research Foundation, 1977, upda~ed using the Wall Street Journal
The l~year bill rate series is from Salomon BrQthers, Analytical Record of
Yields and Yield Spreads. The commodity futures series was derived from price
data in the Wall Street Journal using a method explained in the text.- 16 -
Column 2 shows that by increasing the maturity of the Treasury Bills
from a month to a year, an investor would have raised both his mean annual
real rate of return and its standard deviation. During the 1953-1972 period
the mean would have increased by 46 basis points and the standard
deviation by 20. Over the 1973-78 period the difference in the means
is only 5 basis points, while the difference in standard deviations is 80.
Column 3 presents the real rate of return an investor would have
earned by investing in U.S. Treasury bonds with a 20-year maturity. The
assumption underlying this series is that the. investor bought a 20-year
bond at the beginning of each year and sold it at the end. His return
therefore includes both/coupon interest and capital gains or losses. As the
relatively low mean and high standard deviation in both subperiods indicate,
the past 26 years was a bad time for the investor in long-term bonds. Capital
losses caused by unanticipated increases in long-term interest rates tended
to cancel the coupon yield over this period. While it is probably reasonable
to expect the mean real rate of return to be higher in the future, as l~ng
as int~rest'rates!emain volatile the standard deviation will remain high.
Column 4 presents the real rate of return on the Standard and Poor's
Composite Index of common stocks, which is a value-weighted stock portfolio
of the 500 largest corporations in the U.S.. The return includes dividends
and capital gains. As in the cases of bills and bonds there is a dramatic
decline in mean and increase in standard deviation going from the 1953-72
to the 1973-78 subperiod. 'The mean falls from 10.48% per year to -4.19%,
while the standard deviation rises from 18.19% to 23.87%. Looking at the
year-by-year returns it is clear that stocks did especially badly in years
in which the rate of inflation was high. Thus contrary to the usual assumption
made in the economics literature, that the real return on stocks is uncorrelated
with inflation, the data indicate a nega~ive correlation.7 To verify this- 17 -
negative correlation, we present in Table 4 the correlation coefficients
of the annual returns series reported in Table 3. The correlation coefficient
between the real rate of return on common stocks and the rate of inflation
was -.562 during the 1953-72 subperiod and c.768 during the 1973-78 subperiod.
During the entire 26-year period stocks seem to have behaved more like a
money-fixed security than a claim to a real asset.
Summarizing the data we have examined so far, it is clear that bills
have offered a far more stable annual real rate of return than long-term
bonds or stocks. Furthermore, the 1 month bills are more stable than 1 year
bills. But there is still variation in the real return on I-month bills,
which is caused primarily by variation in the rate of inflation as revealed
by the high negative correlation coefficients in the upper right hand corners
of the matrices in Table 4. During the 1973-78 subperiod that correlation
was -.967, indicating that 93.5% of the variance of the real rate of return
on I-month bills could be explained by inflation. We will now consider how
much of the variance of the real return on bills could have been diversified
away by using commodity futures contracts.- 18 -
Table 4 - Correlation Matrix of Real Rates of Return
a. 1953-1978
1 Year 20 Year Commodity
Bills Bonds Stocks Futwres Inflation
1 Month Bills 0.930 0.438 0.459 -0.417 -0.877
1 Year Bills 0.585 0.524 -0.547 -0.821




1 Month Bills 0.740 0.352 0.097 -0.141 -0.442
1 Year Bills 0.583 0.103 -0.259 -0.302




1 Month Bills 0.941 0.760 0.797 -0.212 -0.967
1 Year Bills 0.870 0.932 -0.494 -0.915
20-Year Bonds ·0.774 -0.531 -0.715
Stocks -0.571 -0.768
Commodity Futures 0.325- 19 -
Column 5 in Table 3 presents the year-by-year annual rate of return one
would have earned on a well-diversified portfolio of commodity futures
contracts over the 1953-78 period.8 The rate of return on a futures
contract was measured as the proportional change in the futures price
over the holding period. The series was generated by assuming a buy-and-hold
strategy whereby contracts were entered into at quarterly intervals, held
for three months, and then liquidated. The number of commodities increases
from 13 in 1953 to 22 by the end of the period. Table 5 presents the
list of commodities and the year in which each was added to the portfolio.
The portfolio was assumed to consist of equal dollar amounts invested in
each commodity.
The rates of return for commodity futures listed in Column 5 of
Table 3 must be interpreted somewhat differently from the real rates in
columns 1 through 4. When an investor takes a long position in a futures
contract, he does not buy it in the sense that he would buy a stock, a Qond,
or the physical commodity itself. Rather, he agrees to purchase the
commodity for a specified price at a certain point in the future. The
commodities exchange, which acts as an intermediary, requires all parties
to a futures contract to post bond which is called "margin," to guarantee
performance. But investors are permitted to post Treasury Bills, on
which they continue to earn the interest, so the funds used as margin are
therefore not strictly speaking an investment in commodity futures.
The rate of return reported in column 5 should, therefore, be interpreted
as the addition to an investor's total investment portfolio rate of
return which he would have earned in each year had he taken a position
in commodity futures equal to the value of his total investments in other
assets. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the additional r~te of return
one would have earned on the Treasury Bills posted as margin, assuming the
amount posted was equal to 100% of the face value of the contracts.- 20 -

















































Our principal interest in commodity futures contracts is to determine
whether they can be used to reduce the variance of the real return on
l-mon~' ~-Bills. Their effectiveness for this purpose is determined by the
degree of correlation between their rate of return and the real return on
T-Bills.9 Indeed, the square of the correlation coefficient measures
the proportional reduction in the variance of the real rate of return on
T-Bills attainable by combining them with the variance-minimizing proportion
of commodity futures contracts. This optimal proportion is equal to
the negative of the correlation coefficient multiplied by the ratio of
the standard deviation of the real return on T-Bills to the standard
deviation of the rate of return on commodity futures. Using the parameters
estimated over the entire 26 year period 1953-78 and reported in Tafules 3
and 4, we find a correlation coefficient of -.417 and standard deviations
of 1.41% and 16.34% respectively. The variance-minimizing proportion
o~ T-Bills was therefore 3.6%, and the proportional reduction in variance
17.4%. This implies that the standard deviation of the real return on the
resulting minimum-variance portfolio is 1.28% vs 1.41% on I-month T-Bills.
The mean real rate of return on the minimum-variance portfolio is 0.63%
per year vs 0.41% on I-month T-Bills.
Thus by adding a small position (3.6%) in commodity futures to I-month
T-Billsone could have attained both a smaller standard deviation and
a higher mean during the 1953-1978 period.
It would seem that T-Bills hedged against unanticipated inflation with
commodity futures offers a relatively stable real rate of return. But even
the hedged T-Bills had a disappointingly low mean real rate of return of
-0~98% per year in the 1973-78 subperiod. While this is considerably
better than the -1.62% on unhedged T-Bills, it is still low.- 22 -
Some improvement in yield can be obtained by investing in other money-market
instruments such as corporate commercial paper and negotiable certificates of
deposit 7 and in long-term floating-rate notes and bonds whose interest rates
are tied to short-term rates. These debt instruments are only slightly
riskier than T-Bills, and institutional investors such as insurance
companies have traditionally been willing to assume that extra risk.
Over the past ten years the average yield spread between gO-day
commercial paper and T-Bills has been about 1% per year although
recently the spread has been narrowing.
Were life insurance companies to offer PPA's to the public, the most
natural use for the funds raised would probab~y. be to make long-term floating-
rate loans to their traditional borrowers. As is the case with the
floating-rate notes recently issued by financial institutions, the
interest rate could be set at some premium above the 6-month Treasury
Bill rate. If, as in the past, the Treasury Bill rate were to more
or less match the concurrent rate of inflation, the premium would
represent the real interest rate on the loan. Under these circumstances
even after expenses PPA's might well be expected to earn at least a
zero real rate of return.
A question which should be addressed in the case of stock
insurance companies (as opposed to mutual companies) is who should bear
the risk associated with possible deviations of the real rate of return
from the assumed rate - the insurance company or the policyholders? The
risk could eas'ily De passed tIil'ough_ to policyholders oy offering PPA' s
as variaole annuities 1 similar in design to eqt1ity~based VA"s.
but based on a portfolio consisting primarily of money~market- 23 -
instruments and long;term floating rate debt instead of common stocks•
.On the other hand, one of the traditional fmctions of stock life
insurance companies has been to transfer risk from the policyholders
to the shareholders. As long as PPA's are fairly priced, these companies
should be willing to offer them with a purchasing power guarantee
and bear the residual investment risk themselves.
IV. PPA's and Corporate Defined - Benefit Pension Plans.
We have been considering the possibility of life insurance c~mpanies
offering PPA's to the public as discretionary annuities, but in the U.S.
most private retirement income is provided by defined-benefit pension plans.
Many of these plans already offer a kind of de facto purchasing:-power
guarantee to their employees through a benefit formula which bases the
monthly retirement payment on the employee's wage just prior to retirement.
Since wages and consumer prices are highly correlated in the long run,
workers covered by such plans can at least count on purchasing-power
protection of pension benefits during the pre-retirement years.
But very few pension plans offer a cost-of-living escalator during
the retirement phase. In recent years some corporations, under pressure
from labor'unions, have made one-time increases in pensions being paid to
retired employees, and if inflation persists at.anything like its current
rate it seems likely that union pressure in this direction will increase.
The analysis presented in this paper suggests that corporate pension plans
could meet these union demands by offering a PPA option to their employees
at retirement. Employees could be offered a choice between a conventional
money-fixed annuity or a PPA, both of which would cost the employer the same
amount of money to fund.- 24 -
V•. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
One need not subscribe to the entire proposal presented in this
paper in order to endorse parts of it. In this last section we will
summarize the proposal, highlighting the separability of its components.
1. It would be desirable for financial intermediaries to offer
households a contractual retirement savings plan where both the
nominal premiums paid in and the dollar value of the annuity
benefits received were scheduled to increase at the rate of in-
flation expected to prevail over the duration of the plan.
During the accumulation period, it would~e relatively easy
to adjust the premiums to the actual rate of inflation experienced.
During the benefit phase, it would be especially desirable to
have an annuity whose dollar value was. qdjusted at leastapproxi'"
mately in accordance with the actual rate of inflation experienced.
2. Because there are no securities in the U. S. capital markets
which offer a riskless real rate of return, PPA's might best be
offered as variable annuities with most of the investment risk
passed through to the policyholders. This risk could be minimized
by using money-market instruments hedged against unanticipated inflation with
a small amount of commodity futures contracts as the asset base. The mean
real rate of return on such a portfolio over the past 26 years has
been about zero, suggesting that if stock insurance compan1es
were to underwrite PPA's, the real earnings rate which they would
use in pricing their policies would be at most zero.
3. In response to the growing demand by labor unions to include a
cost~of~living escalator in defined-benefit pension plans, employers
could offer employees a PPA option which costs them the same as a
conventional annuity.- 25 -
FOO1NOTES
1See Greenough (9) for a more complete explanation of the VA idea.
2See Bodie (2) and (4) for a more complete discussion of this point.
3
See Munnell (11) and Pesando (12).
4
See Blinder (1), Fischer (7)) Friedman (8), and Modigliani and




The calculation was made according to the following explanation given
in TlAA-CREF (15).
Using current mortality rates for male and female annuitants, the
actuaries estimate that for a husband and wife both aged 65 there
must be $164 on hand earning 4% a year (after expense charges) to
pay them $1 monthly under the Joint and 2/3 to Survivor option.*
The Annuity Factor then is 164 for this method of payment to a
couple aged 65. Dividing the annuity owners accumulated retirement
fund by 164 gives the amount of monthly income payable to the couple
as a Joint and 2/3 to Survivor annuity. Or, stated another way, each
$16,400 of accumulated value would provide this couple an initial
income of $100 a month.
To illustrate the conversion of accumulation units to annuity units,
suppose that on April 1, 1978 you and your spouse were age 65 and
began receiving a CREF monthly income under the Joint and 2/3 to Sur-
vivor option mentioned previously.
a. Assume that on April 1 the total value of your accumulation units
was $50,000.
b. The value of your accumulation units would have been divided by the
Annuity Factor of 164 to determine the initial amount of monthly
income payable under the option selected
$50,000 ~ 164 = $304.88 monthly.
c. To determine the number of annuity units that would be used
each month to measure the changing value of your share in
CREF's experience, the $304.88 would then have been divided by
the current value of the annuity unit ($23.28 as of April 1, 1978).- ":;0 -
Thus your accumulation units would have been converted into a series of
13.096 annuity units payable each month as long as both you and your
spouse live, and a series of 8.731 annuity units -- 2/3 of 13.096 --
payable to the survivor each month for life following the death of either
you or your spouse with payments in any event guaranteed to continue for
a minimum of ten years. The monthly income of $304.88 (13.096 X $23.28)
would continue until the next yearly revaluation of the annuity unit, at
which time your monthly income for the succedding year would be determined
by multiplying your 13.096 annuity units by the new annuity unit value.
The amount of your check would thus change on May 1 each year.
*This option pays a life time income to husband and wife, with the amount
reducing by a third at the death of either. If both die within the first
ten years of payments, the two-thirds benefit continues to their named
beneficiary for the balance of the ten-year period.
7See Bodie (3) for a more complete discussion of this point.
8Por a more complete description of the commodity futures series see
Bodie and Rosansky (5).
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Proof: Let sp be the variance of the real rate of return on an investment
in T-Bills hedged with commodity futures contracts, and let x be the ratio
of the face value of the position in futures to the investment inT-Bills.
Then:
S2 2 2 2
P = x Sc + 2xsCT + sT
where s~ is the variance of the rate of return on commodity futures, s~ the
variance of the real rate of return on T-Bills, and sCT the covariance between
them. The variance minimizing ratio, x*, is found by setting the derivative of








Substituting this value for x back into the expression for s~ we find that the





The proportional reduction in the variance of the real rate of return on the
T-Bills is therefore:
2 2 2
s - s s




which is the square of the correlation coefficient between the real rate of
return on T-Bills and the rate of return on commodity futures.